Appeal to experience for rational justification of religious belief is probably as old as the question whether religious belief has any rational support. The issues relevant to such appeal range widely, and I will have to be content to deal with only a few of them.
same way that Napoleon lives is decided. If it is false, Jesus is perfect God and perfect man is also false, but that Jesus is the God-man is not capable of being established by sheer historical research. Men are made in the image of God is an important anthropological claim, Men ought to act in imitation of God an impor tant ethical assertion, and God will judge all men an important element in Christian eschatology. However one wishes to group these claims, and on whatever reasonable criterion one makes such a grouping, the procedures relevant to appraising members of one group will differ somewhat from those relevant to appraising members of another. How far is appeal to experience relevant to such appraisals? How much can numinous experience tell us about these varied sorts of claims? Again, analogous questions arise with respect to nirvanic experiences and the cluster of claims about Brahman and Atman and maya and rebirth and so on which, purportedly, nirvana experiences not only give rise to, but evidentially support. For here too there are claims about man and his destiny, about morality, and about an ultimate, unchang ing reality.
Obviously, one could continue raising questions of this general sort for some time. I wish, however, to use the questions raised thus far as a conceptual context from which to view certain claims concerning religious experience as evidence for religious belief. The questions raised above have pointed up the multiplicity of experiences which are sometimes said to give incorrigible grounds for specific (and mutually incompatible) religious beliefs; the appar ently 'beyond-all-experiential-support' character of some religious beliefs; and the variety of types of claims essential to religious conceptual systems. Keeping these matters in mind, it is time to turn to the concept of religious experience.
II
The concept 'experience' is about as clear as a hairshirt is comfortable. Eating an apple, feeling obligated to keep a promise, falling in love, reflecting on the ontological argument, adding two plus two, appreciating the Mona Lisa, being in pain, and (at least apparently) sensing the presence of God are all experiences. The rationalists Descartes, Leibniz and Spinoza were all, in one sense, devotees of experience. Seeing that a proposition is clearly and distinctly true was an experience they prized highly. The empiricists Locke, Berkeley, and Hume-at least according to the rather inaccurate traditional picture prized such experiences as seeing the tree in the quad more highly than did the rationalists. Waiving the fact that there is probably no useful way of disting uishing between 'empiricist' and 'rationalist' on which one gets the traditional Continental-Anglophile divide as result, seeing a necessary truth seems un shakably an experience. What is debatable is how much knowledge such experiences yield.
Plainly, then, the generic concept 'experience' will not be of much help in reflections concerning religious experience and rational appraisal. Suppose, then, we try, not the concept 'experience', but the concept 'someone having an experience of some thing', defined (roughly, after Mavrodes)l as follows: Someone S has experience of something 0 if and only if: (i) Eis of something; the experienc ing is one thing, the experienced is something else; (2) 0 exists independently of E (or any other experience); (3) 0 is experienced entails 0 exists; (4) S experiences 0 entails 0 affects S; (5) S experiences 0 entails S makes some judgment concerning 0; (6) S and 0 are distinct beings. My seeing my pen, for example, fits the pattern. I exist independently of my pen (satisfying (6) ). I see my pen only if it exists to be seen (satisfying (3) ). But my pen retains its hold on existence even when no one sees it (satisfying (2) ). The seeing in question fits a subject-consciousness-(real) object as well as a subject-consciousness (intentional) object model (satisfying (i) ). It affects me, being at one end of a causal chain involving light waves and a medium and so on with me (or my eyes) at the other end (satisfying (4)). And while I seldom make explicit judgments about my pen, my seeing it at least places me in position to say various things about it (roughly satisfying (5)). Being in pain does not seem to meet these conditions; more importantly for our purposes, experience of God apparently does, whereas attaining nirvana at least if we take 'loss of self' descriptions of nirvana attainment quite at face value-perhaps does not. Notoriously the claims that I must (a) be affected by, and (b) (be at least able to) make judgments concerning, what I experience, are disputable, though I am inclined to grant the appropriate ness of (4) and (5) which enshrine these claims. In any case, let us take the above analysis as a working model for someone's having an experience of something.
If we accept the model, then it seems clear that many persons have had numinous experiences which if veridical fit this model-experiences which are sincerely reported as encounters with an awe-inspiring, worship-worthy deity-and some have taken these experiences to be, by themselves, sufficient evidence that God exists.
It Well, what exactly does this property being self-authenticating amount to? Perhaps this: S's experience E is self-authenticating with respect to claim C if and only if it is logically or causally impossible that S have E but not know that C is true. This definition has the virtue of making it clear that such an experi ence (if any occur) authenticates something to someone. Some philosophers and religious believers have apparently countenanced subject-less experiences. So far as I can see 'subject-less experience' is a contradictory locution (though no doubt one could use it as shorthand for some consistent doctrine). But, waiving this, no experience which was literally subject-less ('belonged to no one') could be (in the above, or I should think in any other plausible, sense) self-authenticating. In this sense of 'self-authentication' then, if a self authenticating experience E authenticates claim C to E's subject S (since E's subject thereby knows C), then C is true.
Will numinous or nirvanic experience be self-authenticating in this sense? So far as I can see Ralph experiences God, but does not know it is God he is experiencing is logically consistent. John Baille, for example, has contended that all men The locution 'causally impossible' is notoriously problematic, but perhaps we can define it sufficiently for present purposes as follows: That x occur is causally impossible if and only if there is a law L (of some natural or social science) such that x's occurrence would falsify L. Then if S's numinous experience E is self-authenticating with respect to God exists, it will be causally impossible that S has E but not know that God exists. And if that is causally impossible, since S knows P entails P is true, it is also causally impos sible that S has E and 'God exists' not be true.
But of course there is in fact no known causal law relating the state of affairs expressed by S has E (no matter what experience E is) and the state of affairs expressed by 'God exists' is true in the required manner. The most that could be claimed (perhaps by an unreconstructed Freudian) is that the states expressed by, say, S has numinous experience E and S believes that God exists are related by causal law. That is implausible, but even if true would not affect the criticism. If the required connection held, it would hold be tween S's experience and God's existence, not between S's experience and S's belief. The state of affairs of God's existence is no antecedent or consequent of any known causal law. (This is, I take it, nothing against that state of affairs.)
It may be objected that I am ignoring what is crucial about self-authenti cating experiences, namely that such an experience authenticates only for (or to) its subject. But I have not ignored this at all. S's experience E is self authenticating (to S; who else?) with respect to C if and only if (a) S has E but C is false is inconsistent, or (b) S has E leads by law to C is true. With respect to numinous experiencers and experiences and God exists, neither (a) nor (b) is known to be satisfied. So (as far as we know) no subject is self authenticated to, at least with regard to contingent claims.
The question is not, of course, whether an omnicompetent God can make himself known to man whenever he wishes. Of course, he can if he is omni potent. The question concerns whether any such revelation is, or can be, self-authenticating. An experience can be if there is some coherent and relevant sense of 'self-authenticating experience'; we shall know this can occur if we discover that sense. An experience is, in this sense, self-authenti cating if it corresponds to this concept (if any). That, not whether God can make Himself known, is what we are investigating.
Turning momentarily to nirvanic experience, surely no such experience could be self-authenticating along causal lines. For what one putatively learns in such experiences is that monism is true. Monism is true, whatever else it involves, presumably entails knowledge of causal connections (as of all relations) is only knowledge of maya. Causal relations, strictly, and from a sub specie aeternitatis view, do not hold. So none hold which yield self authentication.
Alternatively, perhaps S's experience E is self-authenticating with respect to C if and only if it is logically or causally impossible that S have E and not believe C. But of course an experience could be self-authenticating in this sense without it being either the case that C was true or that E provides any evidence whatever for C.
The two previous senses of 'self-authenticating experience', and a third sense shortly to follow, should be distinguished from a very different cognitive role which is often (I think quite legitimately) ascribed to religious experi ences. Some persons have had experiences which enabled them to both see a new 'depth' to life and to integrate into intelligible patterns knowledge and experiences which had hitherto lain for them in conceptual disarray. Alfred North Whitehead refers to this role of religious experience when he remarks that 'rational religion appeals to the direct intuitions of special occasions [e.g., numinous or nirvanic experiences], and to the elucidatory power of its concepts for all occasions'.' Numinous experiences do elicit in some persons already acquainted with theism a 'theistic Gestalt' which enables them to 'make sense' of the world in a way hitherto beyond their ability. It is this integrating capacity which constitutes much at least of the cognitive power of religious experiences and their conceptual settings. To what degree a particular integration is itself rationally cogent is a crucial question to raise in each particular 'integrative instance', and some of what may appro priately go into attempts to answer such questions will occupy us in the concluding sections of this paper.
It may be suggested that what we need is S's experience E is self-authenticating with respect to C if and only if E, by itself, provides sufficient evidence for C. I think we can briefly see that no experience is, even in this less ambitious sense, self-authenticating. Let us say that S's experience E meets the relevance conditions with respect to claim C if and only if (I) S takes Eto be of an 0 which is 0;
(2) if 0 is 0, then C is true; (3) S takes E to be evidence for C. A numinous experience is evidence that God exists if its subject takes himself to be experiencing a numinous being, if there is a numinous being entails God exists So numinous experience (given that, roughly, being numinous entails being God) provides prima facie evidence that God exists, given that there is no evidence (of at least equal strength) that God does not exist and that no correct known explanation of numinous experience shows that it cannot be evidence that God exists. I suggest further that:
(E2) If S has good reason to believe that there is no evidence against C, and that there is no correct explanation of E on which E is not evidence for C, and if E provides S prima facie evidence for C, then S has good evidence for C.
But I think it is plain that one cannot simply 'read off' from any experience (however striking) which gives prima facie evidence for a claim C, that there is no evidence against C nor any correct explanation of E on which E is not evidence for C after all. So no experience, by itself, provides sufficient evidence for a claim. Though my example is taken from a numinous context, this last point holds at least as clearly for nirvanic experience as for numinous. At least four qualificatory and explanatory remarks are in order. First, I have in mind only claims about (roughly) the existence of entities and properties besides the subject and his properties and the experience and its 'phenomenological' properties. Second, by 'an explanation on which E is not evidence for C' (an 'evidence-cancelling explanation' for short), I understand the following: an explanation A is evidence-cancelling witli respect to experience E and claim C if and only if: (i) A is true entails neither C is true nor C is false; (2) A is true plus E occurs together neither entail nor make probable C is true; (3) if A is false and so is every other explanation which like A satisfies (I) and (2), then E occurs entails or makes probable C is true. Thus that Ralph (apparently, anyway) sees pink rats does not provide evidence for pink rats exist if it is true that Ralph has delirium tremens. If one can show that (a) taking peyote produces numinous experiences, (b) Ralph took peyote, then Ralph's numinous experience can be explained without reference to God. If so, then his experience is not evidence that God exists. Perhaps, nonetheless, Ralph experienced God; the point is that so far we've no reason for saying that he did.
Third, as noted briefly above, while I've concentrated on numinous experience, the same argument applies to nirvanic experience. (Ai) No experience is self-authenticating (for any experience E, subject S who is not insane or irrational or imperceptive, and claim C, it is false that E provides S incorrigible evidence for C). (A2) No experience is self-interpreting (for any experience E, subject S, and claim C, it is logically and causally possible that S take E to be good evidence for C whereas in fact E is not good evidence for C). A complete, correct interpretation of E, then, will milk the information potential of E dry. (A3), or something much like it, seems to me rather clearly true, though I realise that those captured by a 'language game' metaphor into taking reality to be a wax nose twistable into whatever configurations one can concoct will disagree. But the differences I allude to here are plainly too deep for treatment in passing. The interest of (A4) can perhaps be made clear by considering the claims that nirvanic experience reveals that every subject-object (whether subject-real object or subject-intentional object, or 'object of thought') distinction is illusory and that (in some sense) 'all is one'. But unless the evidencing experience has both subject (who learns 'final truth') and (intentional) object (the truth learned), how is it possible that one learns the truth of monism from it? And if it is subject intentional-object it too is illusory, and so cannot yield KEITH E. YANDELL knowledge after all. Even if one thinks that this dilemma does not do justice to the claims made for nirvana-and at least it is clear that more discussion is required before we could tell-answering the dilemma will increase our understanding of what attaining nirvana is taken to be and show. If the dilemma is final, (A4) is violated and no nirvanic evidence is forthcoming.
(A5) The logical and causal possibility that one is wrong in taking an experience to be good evidence for a claim is not by itself good evi dence, in any particular case, that one is mistaken in taking an experience to be evidence for a claim. 
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A numinous experience, for example, justifies God exists only if Ejustifies the basic conceptual (or some conceptual) setting in which 'God' is referential and God exists an essential tenet. A conceptual scheme, I take it, is (roughly) a set of propositions relevant to explaining or interpreting a range of data, solving (or dissolving) a set of problems, or articulating a view of what there is. A conceptual scheme F is true if and only if every propositionPsuch that P is essential to F is true. A conceptual system or framework F is false if there is some proposition P such that P is both essential to F and false. These axioms, or some much like them, seem to me to be both acceptable and relevant to rational appraisal of experience, religious or otherwise.
Obviously, they are neither sufficient by themselves nor as lucid as is desirable. They provide at most no more than a tentative beginning. v Turning to other axioms of appraisal not so closely tied to experiential evidence, I suggest (again tentatively and as no more than a bare beginning) that the following, or something much like them, are appropriate tools for subjecting conceptual systems to rational evaluation.
(SI) If a conceptual system contains as an essential element a (one or more membered) set of propositions which is logically inconsistent, it is false. (S2) If a conceptual system F is such that it can be shown that (a) F is true and (b) F is known to be true, are incompatible, then this fact provides a good (though perhaps not conclusive) reason for supposing that F is false.
I take (Si) to be clear and obviously appropriate. Kant used (S2) as part of an argument against materialism. It seems to me a potentially powerful mode of criticism. Perhaps negative theology can be refuted along these lines, though it is certainly criticisable along other lines as well.
(S3) If a conceptual system F is such that it can be shown that (a) F is true, and (b) F's truth-conditions exist, are incompatible, then F is false.
The truth-conditions of a proposition are simply those things which must exist if the proposition is to be true. Plato apparently used (S3) against certain philosophers who denied the existence of Forms. Perhaps Brahman is quality-less can be refuted along these lines.
(S4) If the only rationale for offering a system F is that supposedly F provides a solution for a particular problem, and given F the problem remains, there is no reason to accept F. Thunder is caused by Thor's hammer, God created the world in I44 sixty-minute hours (six calendar days), and God created the world in 4,004 B.C. provide values for 'C', which conflict with data gleaned from such sources as common sense observation and laboratory research.
More interesting than (S5) is an axiom which naturally comes to mind in considering attempts to escape appeal to (S5): (S6) A system F which incorporates ad hoc hypothesis H in order to escape counter-evidence is less plausible than F' which is otherwise in rational parity with F but contains no ad hoc hypotheses.
Conceptual systems are 'systematic' in the sense that their defining proposi tions are mutually relevant to a (one or more membered) set of problems, or an explanation of phenomena, or a (total or partial) view of the world. The defining propositions need not be logically independent (no subset of propositions entails any others), since in such contexts loss of elegance may be overbalanced by the greater clarity logical redundancy sometimes provides. A hypothesis H is ad hoc with respect to F if its only role in F is rebutting some otherwise damning objection. God allowed the Devil to create fossils in order to tempt us is ad hoc, I should think, with respect to traditional Judaic or Christian theism. The necessity of ad hoc adjustment is usually symptomatic of conceptual disease, but I think in addition it is itself a defect. And, it seems right that:
(S7) A system F which cannot explain or assimilate phenomena that lie within its relevance range is false or incomplete.
By the 'relevance range' of a conceptual system I mean the range of data (empirical or other) for which the system provides interpretive context and from which counter-evidence, if any, may be discovered. Of course there will be disputes about 'how much' explanation of its relevant phenomena a particular system should provide. The degree to which a theist must be able to explain evil, or articulate a theodicy, is a case in point. And, generally, appeal to these and other axioms will involve an evaluative skill for which there are no formulated rules. But that is, I take it, inevitable.
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While the A-axioms and S-axioms are relevant to appraising appeals to religious experience and religious conceptual systems, they are (so far as I can see) not restricted to such contexts. If applicable at all, they are generally applicable, appropriate for appraising appeals to non-religious experiences and non-religious conceptual schemes. Given the notorious difficulties of deciding other than arbitrarily what is and what is not 'religious', and the apparent failure of attempts to show that 'religious language games' occupy their unique conceptual orbits from which non-religious viewpoints are necessarily excluded, I take this universality to be a virtue rather than a vice.
Given the range of territory this paper traverses, a concluding disclaimer is surely apropos. It is patent that the concepts of evidence, explanation, rational plausibility, being reasonable to accept, being confirmed by experience, and so on, require much more discussion than I have provided. The above at best constitutes a prolegomenon to rational appraisal of religious experience and belief.
In any case, I have argued that religious experience is not (in any of the senses discussed) self-authenticating, that appeal to religious experience as evidence for religious belief is relevant but not decisive, and that there are axioms for appraising appeals to experience and competing conceptual schemes. I will be grateful if this much is correct. Then the gruelling task of detailed rational appraisal, of applying and adding axioms, can proceed. At least, so far as appraisal goes, this is where I am, and both published arguments and private remarks suggest to me that I am not alone.
